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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to make a quantitative contribution to the inﬂation versus price level
targeting debate. It considers a policy-maker that can set policy either through an inﬂation
targeting rule or a price level targeting rule to minimize a quadratic loss function using the actual
projection model of the Bank of Canada (ToTEM). The paper ﬁnds that price level targeting
dominates inﬂation targeting, although it can lead to much more volatile inﬂation depending on
the weight assigned to output gap stabilization in the loss function. The price level targeting rule
is also found to mimic the full-commitment solution quite well. There is, however, an important
difference: the full-commitment solution does not require stationarity in the price-level. The paper
then analyzes the extent to which the results are sensitive to Hansen and Sargent (2004) model
uncertainty. The paper ﬁnds the price level targeting rule to be robust; its performance deteriorates
slower than the inﬂation targeting rule and the absolute decline in performance is small in
magnitude.
JEL classiﬁcation: E5, E58, D8, D81
Bank classiﬁcation: Uncertainty and monetary policy
Résumé
La présente étude apporte une contribution d’ordre quantitatif au débat entourant le choix d’une
cible formulée en fonction du taux d’inﬂation ou du niveau des prix. On y examine le cas d’une
banque centrale qui peut poursuivre soit une cible d’inﬂation, soit une cible de niveau des prix
aﬁn de minimiser une fonction de perte quadratique dans le cadre du modèle que la Banque du
Canada utilise en pratique pour l’élaboration de ses projections (TOTEM). L’auteur constate
qu’un régime ciblant le niveau des prix est supérieur à un régime de cibles d’inﬂation, même s’il
peut s’accompagner d’une bien plus grande volatilité de l’inﬂation selon l’importance accordée à
la stabilité de l’écart de production dans la fonction de perte. Un tel régime produit des résultats
similaires à la solution de Ramsey. Une importante différence demeure cependant : la solution de
Ramsey ne requiert pas la stationnarité du niveau des prix. L’auteur analyse ensuite le degré de
sensibilité des résultats à l’incertitude du modèle (au sens de Hansen et Sargent, 2004). Le régime
fondé sur une cible de niveau des prix s’avère robuste; son efﬁcacité baisse plus lentement que
celle du régime de cibles d’inﬂation, et elle ne diminue pas autant en termes absolus.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E5, E58, D8, D81
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Incertitude et politique monétaire1 Introduction
What is a better monetary policy framework: in°ation targeting or price level
targeting? Since its introduction in New Zealand in 1990, in°ation targeting
has been adopted by more than twenty economies ( Svensson 2008), including
U.K. and Canada. Yet, recent theoretical results in the literature suggest that
price level targeting can dominate in°ation targeting. Indeed, using a Lucas-
type Phillips curve, Svensson (1999) ¯nds that price level targeting delivers
lower in°ation variability than in°ation targeting and comparable output gap
variability.
Vestin (2006) arrives at a similar conclusion using a simple forward-
looking NKPC model (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1996, Woodford 1999). He
further emphasizes the reason why price level targeting dominates in°ation
targeting in a forward-looking world: under price level targeting, expecta-
tions act like automatic stabilizers. That is, under price level targeting, if
there is a shock that pushes up the price level, private agents expect the
price level to fall in the near future because the price level must eventually
go back to target. These lower expectations of in°ation for the near future
are something that the policy-maker can exploit to bring desired changes in
the economy.
There are at least three caveats to keep in mind when evaluating those
results for practical purposes. First, the fact that price level targeting can
theoretically dominate in°ation targeting does not necessarily mean that the
bene¯ts are quantitatively important. Second, those results have typically
been derived in small-scale models that may be over-simpli¯ed versions of
models that policy-makers rely on in practice. Third, those results are de-
rived in an environment where the policy-maker and economic agents face
no uncertainty about how the economy works. If the policy-maker's model
was mis-speci¯ed, however, would the properties of price-level and in°ation
targeting rules be una®ected?
This paper makes a quantitative contribution to the in°ation versus price-
level targeting debate, but avoids the above three criticisms by (i) using the
actual projection model of the Bank of Canada (ToTEM)1, and (ii) using
1The paper focuses on ToTEM as model of the economy because the in°ation ver-
sus price level targeting debate is of considerable practical importance to the Bank of
Canada. Prior to its 2011 "renewal of the in°ation-control" meetings with the Govern-
ment of Canada, the Bank of Canada is currently leading an ambitious research program
to understand whether it should (i) target a lower in°ation rate than 2 per cent, or (ii)
1robust control to allow for the possibility of model misspeci¯cation.
Speci¯cally, the paper considers a policy-maker that sets policy either
through an in°ation or a price-level targeting rule to minimize a quadratic
loss function, using ToTEM as reference model of the economy. The pa-
per ¯rst ¯nds that price-level targeting dominates in°ation targeting. But
by what magnitude and in what manner depend crucially on the weight as-
signed to output gap stabilization in the loss function. When the weight is
zero, price-level targeting achieves lower in°ation, output gap and change in
interest rate volatility than in°ation targeting. On the other hand, when the
weight is increased, price-level targeting leads to less volatility in the output
gap and change in the interest rate than in°ation targeting, but those lower
volatilities come at the expense of higher volatility in in°ation.
The paper then compares outcomes achieved under simple price level and
in°ation targeting rules to those that would be achieved if the policy-maker
could implement the ¯rst best full-commitment solution. I ¯nd that the
optimized price-level targeting rule performs almost as well as the ¯rst-best
full commitment solution. Yet, there is an important di®erence between the
two: while the price level targeting rule induces price level stationarity, the
full commitment solution does not.
Woodford (2003) found that in a basic NKPC model, full-commitment
optimal policy led to price level stationarity. He, however, argued that since
welfare did not depend on the range of variation in the level of prices, the
results were likely to be unique to the NKPC model. Recently, Gaspar,
Smets, and Vestin (2007) argued that price level stationarity could in fact be
a feature of optimal full-commitment policy in more general models. They
use the Smets and Wouters (2003) model - a model that embodies many more
frictions than the basic NKPC model - to illustrate that the price level was
stationary under cost-push shocks. The result above shows that price-level
stationarity is indeed not a general feature of the full-commitment solution.
For DSGE models like ToTEM, the reason why the price-level targeting rule
can replicate the properties of the full-commitment solution is not because it
leads to a stationary price level. Rather, it is because the full-commitment
solution, like the price-level targeting solution, induces history dependence
in policy. That feature allows expectations to play an important role in
stabilizing the economy.
The paper then analyzes the extent to which the good performance of
target the price level rather than the in°ation rate.
2the price-level targeting rule depends on the assumption that the policy-
maker knows how the economy functions? Speci¯cally, it analyzes how the
price-level and in°ation targeting rules optimized for the reference version of
ToTEM would perform in a world where the correct model is not the refer-
ence version of ToTEM but a robust control version ( Hansen and Sargent
2004, Dennis, Leitemo, and SÄ oderstrÄ om 2006) that economic agents use to
form expectations. Using detection probabilities as a measure of the statis-
tical distance between the reference model and the alternative model, the
paper ¯nds that the performance of the optimized price-level targeting rule
deteriorates slower than the performance of the optimized in°ation targeting
rule. Moreover, in alternative models that would be statistically plausible,
the absolute decline in performance is small in magnitude.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 brie°y introduces ToTEM,
section 3 describes the problem of the policy-maker and presents the results,
section 4 discusses the policy-maker's problem under model uncertainty and
presents the results and section 5 concludes.
2 Policy analysis in ToTEM
ToTEM is an open-economy DSGE model in which micro-foundations are
used to describe the interactions between various economic agents: house-
holds, ¯rms, government, and central bank. Optimizing behavior from these
agents yield a set of ¯rst-order conditions that dictate how these agents
behave. This set of ¯rst-order conditions combined with market clearing
conditions yield a system of dynamic non-linear equations that character-
ize the behavior of the economy (see Murchison and Rennison 2006). Since
ToTEM is used not only for policy analysis but also projections at the Bank
of Canada, the model is more elaborate than the typical open economy model
of the literature. What follows is a brief non-technical summary borrowed
from Cayen, Corbett, and Perrier (2006).
The production side of ToTEM is as follows: There are four types of ¯nal
goods produced by domestic ¯rms: consumption, investment, government
and non-commodity export goods. To produce these goods, ¯rms use a CES
technology that combines capital with labor services, imported intermediate
goods, and commodities. There is also a commodity sector. The commodities
are produced by domestic ¯rms by combining labor services with capital
goods and a ¯xed factor that we refer to as land. All ¯rms are allowed
3to vary their utilization rate, but this comes at a cost in terms of foregone
output. The ¯rms also face adjustment costs on the level of employment
and on the change in investment, also in terms of foregone output. ToTEM
assumes that ¯nal good producers are monopolistically competitive, which
allow them to ¯x prices for more than one period following Calvo (1983).
The Calvo pricing framework is also used for introducing wage rigidities and
import prices rigidities as in Smets and Wouters (2002).
The demand side of ToTEM can be summarized as follows. Domestic
households buy the ¯nal consumption goods as well as bonds from the (do-
mestic) government and foreigners. They earn (after-tax) labor income from
the labor services that they provide to the domestic ¯rms and income from
their holding of domestic and foreign bonds in the form of interest pay-
ments. They also receive transfers from the government. The government
buys the ¯nal government goods from the domestic ¯rms with tax revenues
and distributes transfers to the domestic households. These expenditures are
¯nanced with the tax revenues from labor income and indirect taxes. The
model assumes that the government targets a desired level for the debt-to-
GDP ratio, with some smoothing, and uses the tax rate on labor income as
the policy instrument. Foreigners buy the commodities exports as well as
the ¯nal non-commodity export goods. They also sell intermediate imported
goods to the domestic importers, and they buy and sell bonds.
Foreign variables in ToTEM are presently generated with a semi-
structural model. This model is exogenous with respect to the core of ToTEM
in the sense that there is no feedback from domestic variables to the foreign
variables. This is consistent with the fact that Canada is a small open-
economy. The foreign variables that enter in ToTEM are output and the
output gap, in°ation rate, interest rates (real and nominal) and real com-
modity prices.
Following Cayen, Corbett, and Perrier (2006), projections using ToTEM
assume that monetary policy is implemented through the generalized Taylor
rule
it = ½¼it¡1 + B¼Et¼t+h + Á¼yt; (1)
By minimizing a quadratic loss function in in°ation, output gap and the
change in interest rate, Cayen, Corbett, and Perrier (2006) obtain the opti-
mized values (½¼;B¼;Á¼;h) = (0:95;1;0:0175;2).
In this paper, I will work with a ¯rst-order linearized version of ToTEM.
4Once linearized, ToTEM can be written in structural form as
H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + Bit + C²t+1 = 0; (2)
where Xt is the time t structural vector, it is the interest rate, and ²t is a
vector of shocks. In the set-up above, the non-zero columns of H3 determine
the forward-looking variables that the policy-maker needs to solve for when
setting it.
3 In°ation Targeting or Price-level Targeting
for ToTEM
In this paper, I assume a policy-maker that has preferences for in°ation
stability, output stabilization relative to potential, as well as some concern
for the volatility of the interest rate. The policy-maker can credibly commit
either to an in°ation targeting rule2
it = ½¼it¡1 + B¼Et¼t+2 + Á¼yt; (3)
or to a price-level targeting rule











t + º(it ¡ it¡1)
2ª
; (5)
subject to the forward-looking model (2).
If the policy-maker sets policy using the in°ation targeting rule, he
chooses the coe±cients (½¼;B¼;Á¼) of (3) to minimize the loss function (5)
subject to the model (2). On the other hand, if he chooses policy through the
price-level targeting rule, he optimally chooses (½p;Bp;ÁP) of (4) to minimize
(5) subject to (2).
My objective in this section is to compute and compare the performance
of optimized in°ation and price-level targeting rules. Since I assume an ad-
hoc loss function, I will present results for various choices of the weights to
output gap (!) and interest rate stabilization (º).
2An in°ation targeting rule like (1) is currently used for projections and policy analyis
in ToTEM at the Bank of Canada. Cayen, Corbett, and Perrier (2006) ¯nds that 2
quarter-ahead expected in°ation is optimal for ToTEM.
5Table 1: Optimized simple rules: 0 · ½¼;½P · 1 and Á¼;ÁP ¸ 0
IT PLT
! º ½¼ B¼ Á¼ ½P BP ÁP
loss IT
loss PLT
0 0.1 1 3.94 0.02 0.94 0.94 0.01 1.5
0 0.5 1 1.49 0 0.92 0.330 0.00 1.5
0 1 1 0.99 0 0.92 0.21 0.00 1.4
0.1 0.1 1 12.57 0 0.73 0.07 0.98 4.8
0.1 0.5 1 5.50 0 0.76 0.03 0.38 3.9
0.1 1 1 3.72 0 0.78 0.02 0.25 3.6
0.5 0.1 1 21.05 0 0.77 0.04 2.44 15.8
0.5 0.5 1 11.72 0 0.77 0.02 0.94 9.8
0.5 1 1 8.42 0 0.78 0.01 0.62 8.0
1 0.1 1 24.27 0 0.78 0.03 3.63 26.3
1 0.5 1 15.48 0 0.77 0.01 1.40 14.6
1 1 1 11.62 0 0.77 0.01 0.93 11.4
3.1 Results
I ¯rst impose the constraint that the degree of inertia, for both rules, lie
between 0 and 1 i.e. 0 · ½¼;½P · 1 and the response to the output gap
non-negative i.e. Á¼;ÁP ¸ 0. Table 1 shows the optimized coe±cients of
the in°ation targeting rule (3), of the price-level targeting rule (4), and their
relative performance across di®erent policy objectives, obtained by varying
the weight to output gap stabilization, !, between 0, 0.1, 0.5 and 1 and the
weight to interest rate stabilization, º, between 0.1, 0.5 and 1. Three obser-
vations are in order: (i) price-level targeting dominates in°ation targeting
signi¯cantly - the value of the loss function for in°ation targeting ranges
from 1.5 times to 26.3 times higher relative to price-level targeting, (ii) the
optimized price-level targeting rule requires a relatively high degree of inertia
(> 0:77) and a strong response to the output gap, and (iii) the optimized
in°ation targeting rule is only constrained optimal; the optimal degree of
inertia is 1 and the optimal response to the output gap is 0 across most
preference con¯gurations
A degree of inertia equal to one in the in°ation targeting rule (and an
optimized response to the output gap equal to 0 for most of our considered
6Table 2: Optimized rules with no inertia i.e. ½¼ = ½P = 0 and Á¼;ÁP ¸ 0
IT PLT
! º B¼ Á¼ BP ÁP
loss IT
loss PLT
0 0.1 4.29 0.07 1.26 0.02 3.00
0 0.5 2.11 0.03 0.49 0.03 3.28
0 1 1.60 0.02 0.33 0.03 3.51
0.1 0.1 12.83 0 0.10 1.64 5.33
0.1 0.5 5.06 0 0.05 0.74 4.59
0.1 1 3.47 0 0.04 0.54 4.29
0.5 0.1 27.09 0 0.04 3.80 14.06
0.5 0.5 11.96 0 0.02 1.66 9.23
0.5 1 8.01 0 0.02 1.18 7.81
1 0.1 35.02 0 0.03 5.47 21.84
1 0.5 17.32 0 0.02 2.37 12.66
1 1 11.85 0 0.01 1.67 10.26
preference con¯gurations) makes it a policy rule where the ¯rst-di®erence of
the interest rate responds to in°ation. That rule is equivalent to a price-level
targeting rule. Since my purpose in this paper is to compare the properties
of in°ation and price-level targeting rules, the rest of this paper will consider
non-inertial in°ation and price-level targeting rules except where noted. Ta-
ble 2 reports the optimized coe±cients when the degree of inertia for both
rules are constrained to zero i.e. ½¼ = ½P = 0. I ¯nd that the non-inertial
optimized price-level targeting rule dominate the non-inertial optimized in-
°ation targeting rule across all con¯gurations.3
How do price-level targeting and in°ation targeting di®er and why does
price-level targeting dominate in°ation targeting so signi¯cantly? Table 3
provides a ¯rst clue to the answer. Table 3 displays the standard deviation
of in°ation, output gap, and change in the interest rate under the optimized
non-inertial in°ation targeting and price-level targeting rules. Two results
3Table 5 in the appendix computes the unrestricted optimized coe±cients. The unre-
stricted optimized in°ation targeting rule still performs signi¯cantly worse than the opti-
mized price-level targeting rule. However, the large values of the unrestricted optimized
coe±cients make them not sensible for practical applications.
7Table 3: Standard deviation of in°ation, output gap, change in interest rate
under non-inertial IT and PLT
¾¼t ¾yt ¾¢it
! º PLT IT PLT IT PLT IT
0 0.1 0.40 0.68 2.03 2.43 0.19 0.34
0 0.5 0.50 0.85 2.09 2.67 0.10 0.20
0 1 0.54 0.93 2.13 2.79 0.07 0.17
0.1 0.1 0.89 0.51 0.53 2.09 0.43 0.73
0.1 0.5 0.88 0.68 0.74 2.25 0.24 0.39
0.1 1 0.87 0.75 0.85 2.33 0.19 0.30
0.5 0.1 0.94 0.41 0.31 2.01 0.71 1.16
0.5 0.5 0.94 0.53 0.49 2.10 0.43 0.70
0.5 1 0.93 0.59 0.58 2.16 0.34 0.54
1 0.1 0.95 0.37 0.24 1.99 0.87 1.34
1 0.5 0.95 0.47 0.40 2.05 0.54 0.88
1 1 0.94 0.53 0.49 2.10 0.43 0.70
stand out: (i) when ! = 0, price-level targeting dominates in°ation targeting
both in stabilizing in°ation, output gap and the interest rate, and (ii) when
! > 0, in°ation targeting works by stabilizing in°ation at the expense of
stabilizing the output gap. As a result, it does very well in stabilizing in°ation
relative to price-level targeting but only at the expense of letting the output
gap become quite volatile.
To further understand how price-level targeting di®ers from in°ation
targeting, I now compare how the two rules would respond to a demand
shock4- an exogenous decline in the discount factor that pushes up consump-
tion under two benchmark preference con¯gurations: (!;º) = (0;0:5) and
(!;º) = (1;0:5).
Figure 1 depicts the (!;º) = (0;0:5) case. The positive consumption
shock pushes up consumption by 2.2% after one year. Following the increase
in consumption, ¯rms in the economy want to increase output. In ToTEM,
4In the appendix, Figure 6 and Figure 7 display the impulse responses to a technology
shock for ! = 0 and ! = 1 respectively. The same type of analysis done for the demand
shock carries over to the technology shock.
8Figure 1: impulse responses to a positive consumption shock (! = 0)





















































































9however, an increase in output leads to an increase in marginal cost. With
higher marginal cost, ¯rms that increase output also want to increase their
prices (although not all of them can). Notice that under price-level targeting,
the initial impact of the consumption shock on in°ation is smaller than under
in°ation targeting (0.2 pp vs 0.4 pp). Why does this happen? Under price-
level targeting ¯rms know that the policy-maker is committed to bringing
the price-level back to target. Hence, they anticipate that an initial increase
in prices will eventually be followed by falling prices in the near future. The
expectation of falling prices in the near future makes it optimal for ¯rms
to increase their prices by less in response to the shock. Therefore, under
price-level targeting, the expectation that the policy-maker will bring the
price-level back to its anticipated path helps to spread the e®ects of shocks
over time and hence reduce volatility.
Figure 2 considers the (!;º) = (1;0:5) case. The behavior of the in°ation
targeting rule is not markedly di®erent compared to the (!;º) = (0;0:5) case.
In response to the consumption shock, some ¯rms increase their prices leading
to aggregate in°ation of 0.2 pp. The policy-maker reacts to the positive
in°ation by increasing the interest rate by 0.7 pp. Since not all ¯rms can
adjust their prices in response to the interest rate and consumption changes,
they adjust by changing their output. This accounts for the high volatility
of output under in°ation targeting.
Under price-level targeting, the policy-maker reacts very strongly to the
output gap. When ¯rms increase output in response to the positive con-
sumption shock, the policy-maker increases the interest rate more than pro-
portionately (0.65 pp). The interest rate increase is so high that it causes
¯rms to decrease their prices in response to the consumption shock. The
decline in the price-level is then followed by a period of rising prices to bring
the price-level back to target. Since it takes time for the e®ect of the shock
to vanish, the price-level targeting rule leads to higher volatility in in°ation
relative to the in°ation targeting regime.
To the extent that the ad hoc quadratic loss function is a good represen-
tation of the criterion that policy-makers use to set policy, the analysis above
illustrates the importance of correctly gauging what the weight to output gap
stabilization is in deciding between in°ation and price-level targeting rules.
While the qualitative behavior of the in°ation targeting rule does not vary
much with that parameter, how the price-level targeting rule stabilizes the
economy di®ers markedly depending on whether that parameter is high or
low.
10Figure 2: impulse responses to a positive consumption shock (! = 1)



























































































11The result also points to the importance of doing proper model-consistent
welfare calculations. In a model as complex as ToTEM, social welfare will
in general be of a much more complicated functional form than the assumed
quadratic loss function. For accurate social welfare comparisons, we should
in fact use second-order approximation techniques (see Kim and Kim 2003,
Schmitt-Groh¶ e and Uribe 2004 and references therein). This is, however,
presently not feasible in ToTEM.
3.2 Price-level targeting versus full-commitment
Table 4: Standard deviation of in°ation, output gap, change in interest rate
under the optimized inertial PLT and the full commitment solution
¾¼t ¾yt ¾¢it
! º FC PLT PLT FC PLT PLT FC PLT PLT
½P = 0 ½P = 0 ½P = 0
0 0.1 0.32 0.32 0.40 2.05 2.04 2.03 0.14 0.16 0.19
0 0.5 0.40 0.41 0.50 2.08 2.07 2.09 0.08 0.08 0.10
0 1 0.44 0.45 0.54 2.10 2.10 2.13 0.06 0.06 0.07
0.1 0.1 0.79 0.90 0.89 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.30 0.37 0.43
0.1 0.5 0.80 0.90 0.88 0.63 0.63 0.74 0.17 0.21 0.24
0.1 1 0.81 0.90 0.87 0.71 0.72 0.85 0.13 0.16 0.19
0.5 0.1 0.87 0.96 0.94 0.24 0.25 0.31 0.47 0.60 0.71
0.5 0.5 0.88 0.96 0.94 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.30 0.36 0.43
0.5 1 0.88 0.96 0.93 0.48 0.49 0.58 0.24 0.29 0.34
1 0.1 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.54 0.72 0.87
1 0.5 0.89 0.97 0.95 0.32 0.33 0.40 0.37 0.46 0.54
1 1 0.89 0.97 0.94 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.30 0.36 0.43
This section compares the performance and behavior of optimized price-
level targeting rules to the full commitment solution. Given the quadratic
loss function (5) and the model (2), section A.1 of the appendix shows that
the full-commitment solution for the interest rate is
it = FXXt¡1 + F¹¹t¡1; (6)
12where Xt¡1 are predetermined state variables and ¹t¡1, the lagrange mul-
tipliers associated with the forward-looking variables Xt+1. Therefore, the
full-commitment solution is in general much more complex than a simple pol-
icy rule, in that it requires the interest rate to depend not only on the set of
predetermined variables, but also on the shadow price of the forward-looking
variables. What this implies for a policy-maker using the full-commitment
solution is that he is tied to the promise he makes when optimizing at time 0
i.e. he must make choices consistent with the value at which he initializes ¹¡1
at time 0. The full-commitment solution is said to be time-inconsistent since
at any time t > 0, there is a temptation for the policy-maker to re-optimize
and reset the lagrange multipliers.
Table 4 displays the standard deviation of in°ation, output gap and
change in interest rate under the full-commitment solution, optimized non-
inertial price-level targeting rule and optimized inertial price-level targeting
rule. I ¯nd that both the non-inertial and inertial perform reasonably well
with respect to the full-commitment solution. In particular, similar to the
full commitment solution, both rules emphasize stabilizing the output gap at
the expense of in°ation for higher weights to output gap stabilization. The
inertial rule in particular performs only slightly worse than the full commit-
ment solution in stabilizing in°ation and the output gap.
Figures 4 and 5 in the appendix compares the impulse responses of di®er-
ent variables to the consumption shock under the non-inertial rule, inertial
rule, and full-commitment solution. I ¯nd that the paths of variables under
the price-level targeting rules follow closely the paths of the ¯rst-best full-
commitment solution to one exception: while the price-level eventually gets
back under control under price-level targeting, the ¯rst-best solution does
not. In fact, given our loss function, the ¯rst-best solution does not require
stationarity in the price-level.5
Why then do the price-level targeting rules mimic the full-commitment
solution so well? The price-level targeting solution is characterized by two
important features: (i) stationarity in the price level, and (ii) history de-
pendence. It induces a dependence on the past, in that the policymaker is
committed to correct past deviations of the price-level from target. It is that
commitment to correct past deviations that allow expectations to play a cru-
5Cateau (2008) derives a formula for determining whether price level stationarity is a
characteristic of full commitment optimal policy in three di®erent forward-looking DSGE
models. He ¯nds that, in general, it is not.
13cial role in price-level targeting. That history dependence, rather than the
stationarity in the price-level, is the feature that introduces a connection to
the full commitment solution.
Indeed, the full-commitment solution is also characterized by history de-
pendence. The full-commitment solution depends on the lagrange multipli-
ers associated with the forward-looking variables. When optimizing at time
t = 0, the policymaker initializes those shadow prices to zero and makes
a promise that at any time t > 0, it will not re-optimize and reset those
shadow prices to zero. The commitment to the time 0 promise implies that
at any time t > 0, optimal policy must be consistent with the time t = 0
lagrange multiplier initializations. Thus, the optimal full commitment pol-
icy is also history dependant. That history dependence allows for a role for
expectations in the same way that it does under price-level targeting.
4 Price-level targeting versus in°ation tar-
geting under model uncertainty
The previous section showed that in ToTEM, with a quadratic loss func-
tion, an optimized price-level targeting rule would dominate an optimized
in°ation targeting rule across a number of the policy-maker's preference con-
¯gurations. To what extent do those results depend on the assumption that
the policy-maker knows how the economy works? If ToTEM was a mis-
speci¯ed representation of the economy, there are at least two reasons why
the performance of the price-level targeting rule could be a®ected. First,
the policy prescribed in the reference model could be misleading. Thus, in
practice, the policy-maker may ¯nd it di±cult to control the price-level. Sec-
ond, price-level targeting works by exploiting the expectations of economic
agents. Therefore, if the expectations of economic agents di®er in an impor-
tant way from the model-consistent expectations, the mechanism through
which price-level targeting works may be hampered.
The policy-maker of this paper addresses his concerns about model mis-
speci¯cation by analyzing how the price-level and in°ation targeting rules,
optimized for his reference version of ToTEM, would perform in a world
where the correct model is not the reference version of ToTEM, but a robust
control version that economic agents use to form expectations.









an evil agent distorts the reference model (2)
H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + Bit + Cwt + C²t+1 = 0; (8)
by choosing a distortion wt to maximize the loss function (5) subject to the







t < ³: (9)
Following Hansen and Sargent (2004) and Dennis, Leitemo, and SÄ oderstrÄ om
















~ H1Xt¡1 + ~ H2Xt + ~ H3Xt+1 + ~ Cwt + ~ C²t = 0; (11)
where ~ Q; ~ H1; ~ H2; ~ H3 and ~ C are obtained by substituting (7) in (5) and (8)
respectively and simplifying. Following Hansen and Sargent (2004), it can
also be shown that µ¡1 is directly related to the size of the distortion ³.



















The distortion that the evil agent introduces in the reference model will,
therefore, in°uence both the dynamics and volatility of variables in the econ-
omy. How much the model is distorted by the evil agent will depend on the
bound on the distortion, and hence µ¡1. In practical applications, it is im-
portant to pick µ¡1 sensibly. I use the statistical detection probability theory
to discipline the choice of µ¡1.
15To understand what detection probabilities are, consider the following
example. Suppose that a decision-maker faces two models, A and B, and
has a ¯nite data set to determine which one of the two models is the data
generating model. Now suppose that model A generates the data. In a ¯nite
data set, if the models are not too far apart there is a positive probability for
the decision-maker to conclude that model B is the data-generating model
even though model A generates the data. The detection probability is the
average probability that the decision-maker erroneously concludes that model
B generates the data when it is in fact model A or that model A generate
the data when it is in fact model B (see Dennis, Leitemo, and SÄ oderstrÄ om
2006 for more details).
Why are detection probabilities suitable for disciplining the choice of µ¡1?
They give a measure of the statistical distance between the reference model
and the distorted model. If µ¡1 = 0, the detection probability is equal to 0.5.
Why? Because if µ¡1 = 0, the reference model and distorted model are the
same, and hence they are both equally likely to generate the data. However,
as we increase µ¡1, the distorted model grows further apart from the reference
model. The detection probability will fall below 0.5 since it becomes easier
to distinguish between the two models even in a ¯nite data set. Hansen and
Sargent (2004) argue that µ¡1 should be chosen to correspond to a detection
probability between 10-20%.
4.1 Results
In this section, I answer two questions: (i) how much does model misspeci-
¯cation a®ect the absolute level of the losses under price-level targeting and
in°ation targeting, and (ii) how fast does the performance of the price-level
(and in°ation) targeting rule deteriorate with misspeci¯cation.
Figure 3 considers the benchmark case (!;º) = (0;0:5). The upper left
panel displays how the in°ation targeting rule optimized for the reference
ToTEM (µ
¡1
IT = 0) would perform if the true model was in fact a distorted
model indexed by some µ
¡1
IT > 0. The upper right panel repeats that exercise
for the price-level targeting rule optimized for the reference model (µ
¡1
PT = 0).
The two ¯gures convey a similar conclusion: rules optimized for the reference
model can perform very badly for large values of µ
¡1
j ;j = IT; PT, the bound
on the size of the distortion. Intuitively, a large µ
¡1
j implies a distorted model
that is quite far from the reference model and hence, it is not surprising to
¯nd that the rule optimized for the reference model does not have enough
















































































Figure 3: performance of non-inertial in°ation and price-level targeting rule
under misspeci¯cation
17°exibility to perform well in the distorted model.
To compare the performance of price-level targeting and in°ation target-





PT. The lower panel of ¯gure 3 plots the percentage increases in





j =0) ¡ 1
¶
, j = IT, PT against the detection proba-
bility. I ¯nd that for models that are statistically close i.e. a detection proba-
bility range between 0.5-0.1, the performance of the price-level targeting rule
deteriorates more slowly than that of the in°ation targeting rule. Further-
more, for the same set of statistically close models, the consequence of model
uncertainty does not seem very important in absolute terms. Indeed, for the
price-level targeting rules, the performance deteriorates by about 0.5% while
for the in°ation targeting rule, it deteriorates by 0.7%.
What can we conclude from the above exercise? If the assumption that
ToTEM is a good reference model holds, the optimized price-level targeting
rule is robust. If agents form expectations according to an alternative model
within a reasonable distance from the reference model, it's performance does
not deteriorate very fast. Further, the absolute increase in the level of the
loss is relatively small. Therefore, allowing for model mis-speci¯cation µ a la
Hansen and Sargent (2004) does not a®ect the conclusion that the price-level
targeting rule dominates the in°ation targeting rule signi¯cantly.
We should keep in mind however that the result above does not imply
that model uncertainty does not matter for policy-making. First, using a dif-
ferent metric than detection probabilities may allow model mis-speci¯cation





PT the increase in losses is high. Therefore, a di®erent




PT would allow for model uncer-
tainty to have bigger impact. Moreover, we allow for model mis-speci¯cation
µ a la Hansen and Sargent (2004). Their approach is a simple and computa-
tionally convenient way to allow for unstructured model mis-speci¯cation in
a linear-quadratic set-up. Di®erent types of unstructured model uncertainty,
e.g. Onatski and Williams (2003), or more structured model uncertainty, e.g
parameter uncertainty, may yield di®erent results.
185 Conclusion
This paper considers a policy-maker that uses ToTEM as the model of the
Canadian economy and sets policy through a simple rule to minimize a
weighted average of the variance of in°ation, output gap, and changes in
the interest rate. I ¯rst compare the performance of in°ation-targeting and
price-level targeting rules for a number of con¯gurations of the policy-maker's
loss function.
I ¯nd that across all con¯gurations, the optimized price-level targeting
rule dominates the in°ation targeting rule signi¯cantly. How the price-level
targeting achieves that superiority, however, depends importantly on how
much weight the policy-maker assigns to stabilizing the output gap. If that
weight is zero, the optimized price-level targeting rule achieves lower volatil-
ity in both in°ation, output gap and the change in the interest rate than
the optimized in°ation targeting rule. However, when the weight is positive,
there is a trade-o® between stabilizing in°ation and output gap. The op-
timized price-level targeting rule dominates the in°ation targeting rule by
stabilizing the output gap much better even though it allows the in°ation
rate to be more volatile.
A stable output gap and a relatively more volatile in°ation rate (when the
weight to output-gap stabilization is positive) is in fact what would be fully
optimal in a full-commitment solution. I show that the optimal price-level
targeting rule yields responses that are very similar to the full commitment
solution to one exception: the full commitment solution does not require the
price-level stationarity. I argue from that result that the critical reason why
price-level targeting behaves very similarly to the full commitment solution is
not because it yields stationarity in the price-level but because both solutions
induce a dependance on the past and rely on expectations to spread the e®ects
of shocks over time.
Finally, I verify whether my conclusion that price-level targeting dom-
inates in°ation targeting signi¯cantly is sensitive to model uncertainty. I
consider how a price-level targeting rule optimized for the reference ToTEM
would perform in a world where the correct model is not the reference version
of ToTEM but a robust control version that economic agents use to form ex-
pectations. I ¯nd that in models that are at a reasonable distance from the
reference model (based on detection probabilities), the price-level targeting
rule is robust. It's performance does not deteriorate very rapidly and the
absolute increase in the loss is also relatively small.
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21A Optimal and robust control
A.1 Full commitment solution











subject to the model
H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + Bit = 0: (15)
Notice that since the loss function (14) is quadratic and the model linear, I
can solve the non-stochastic version of the policy-maker's problem owing to
certainty equivalence.











t (H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + Bit)g: (16)
The ¯rst-order conditions are
it : it = ¡R
¡1B
0¹t (17)







¡1¹t¡1 = 0: (18)
By substituting the f.o.c.'s for it into the constraint (15), we obtain
H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 ¡ BR
¡1B
0¹t = 0: (19)














































22It can be shown that given the transversality conditions and appropriate












The matrix N can be solved for using invariant subspace methods (e.g. Den-
nis 2003) or iterative methods. The full commitment decision rule for it is























I will write the full commitment solution as it = FXXt¡1 + F¹¹t¡1.
A.2 Dynamics in a stochastic system
In this section I consider the problem recast as a stochastic system. Beginning
with
H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + Bit + C²t+1 = 0; (25)
and performing similar substitutions and manipulations as in section A.1, I





















²t+1 = 0: (26)


















In the robust control problem, the policy-maker chooses policy through the

















H1Xt¡1 + H2Xt + H3Xt+1 + Bit + C
¤wt = 0: (29)
It can be shown (see Hansen and Sargent 2004) that µ¡1 indexes the size of
the distortion that the evil agent is allowed to introduce in the policy-maker's









that the policy-maker chooses on the basis on an undistorted reference model
fares in a model distorted by the evil agent. Therefore, given the rule (30),
















~ H1Xt¡1 + ~ H2Xt + ~ H3Xt+1 + ~ Cwt = 0: (32)
where ~ Q; ~ H1; ~ H2; ~ H3 and ~ C are obtained by substituting (30) in (28) and (29)
respectively.















~ H1Xt¡1 + ~ H2Xt + ~ H3Xt+1 + ~ Cwt
´o
:(33)
The ¯rst-order conditions are
wt : wt = µ
¡1 ~ C
0¹t (34)
Xt : ~ QXt + ~ H
0
1¯¹t+1 + ~ H
0
2¹t + ~ H
0
3¯
¡1¹t¡1 = 0: (35)
By repeating the procedure in section (A.1), the solution to the evil agent







































I will write the decision rule for wt as wt = KXXt¡1 + K¹¹t¡1.
25Table 5: Unrestricted optimized in°ation targeting rule
! º ½¼ B¼ Á¼
loss IT
loss PLT
0 0.1 2.19 10.90 -0.02 1.15
0 0.5 1.56 2.75 -0.01 1.15
0 1 1.43 1.65 0.00 1.16
0.1 0.1 3.46E+05 8.60E+06 -1.91E+06 2.96
0.1 0.5 2.97E+05 2.06E+06 -3.60E+05 2.65
0.1 1 6.68E+04 3.02E+05 -4.90E+04 2.50
0.5 0.1 1.74E+05 9.56E+06 -4.75E+06 4.75
0.5 0.5 9.20E+05 1.68E+07 -7.29E+06 3.99
0.5 1 3.35E+05 3.40E+06 -1.32E+06 3.69
1 0.1 1.81E+00 1.28E+02 -8.14E+01 5.96
1 0.5 4.19E+05 1.13E+07 -6.70E+06 4.44
1 1 3.32E+06 4.96E+07 -2.73E+07 4.06
26Figure 4: impulse responses to a positive consumption shock; full commit-
ment versus price-level targeting (! = 0)
































































































27Figure 5: impulse responses to a positive consumption shock; full commit-
ment versus price-level targeting (! = 1)
































































































28Figure 6: impulse responses to a positive technology shock (! = 0)





























































































29Figure 7: impulse responses to a positive technology shock (! = 1)
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